CHINA MAY SEEK TO TAKE OVER TAIWAN BY BLOCKADE INCREASING THE THREAT TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES

By Stas Margaronis

There are growing signs that China may use a blockade of Taiwan to take over that nation, with or without an invasion. Right now, the United States is ill-quipped to defend against such a blockade, according to a report published by the U.S. Naval War College.

China has become more aggressive in its threats to U.S. allies in the Pacific and by extension to the United States and may seek to land the knockout punch by the successful take-over of Taiwan.

China insists that Taiwan is Chinese territory even though it has a democratically elected government. China has staged almost daily military activities around the island, including war games that have practiced blockades and attacks on ports.

Taiwan’s government has so far withstood China’s threats but pressure from China on Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines is growing and that threat is inching closer to the United States.

The next president of the United States must make defense of the Pacific a top national security priority or face the consequences of a national security and economic disaster.

China threatens the lives and freedoms of 24 million Taiwanese people and if that were not bad enough, China’s take-over of Taiwan could have a devastating impact on the U.S. economy and for nations around the world.

The 2023 U.S. Taiwan Business Council Final Report: U.S., Taiwan, and Semiconductors: A Critical Supply Chain Partnership warned:

“Countries around the world serve as key nodes in a dispersed network of suppliers for these core building blocks of the technology that modern society has come to rely upon. The U.S. works with partners around the globe, and yet the island of Taiwan may be the most critical link in the entire technology ecosystem. Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs), which both design and produce semiconductors, play an important role in the industry — with two of the largest such companies based in the United States. However, contract manufacturers of semiconductors (known as “foundries”) and associated companies based in Taiwan also serve as key U.S. supply chain partners. Taiwan is a significant supplier not only to leading U.S. technology firms like Apple, Texas Instruments, and Qualcomm, but also to U.S. allies globally.” (See: https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/us-taiwan-and-semiconductors-a-critical-supply-chain-partnership/)

This threat was echoed by the Washington D.C. based Hudson Institute which amplified on the U.S. Taiwan Business Council report:

“According to a new study, losing access to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would have a negative impact on the U.S. economy greater than either the global financial crisis of 2008 or the COVID lockdown of 2020. A significant disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry could affect as much as $1.6 trillion, or roughly 8%, of America’s annual gross domestic product — hurting industries like personal electronics, automotives and telecommunications. And even this estimate may be low, considering how our lives, from farming to health care, are increasingly reliant on new technologies that require more advanced chips.

Nearly one in five semiconductors used for exports comes out of Taiwan. Taiwanese companies account for nearly 75% of manufacturing of the most advanced chips in the world. As the pandemic lockdown showed us, if there’s a disruption to the industries that rely on a continuous flow of semiconductors, large swaths of the economy can suffer from a domino effect of delays, loss of sales, and factory shutdowns.”[1]

The blockade and or take over of Taiwan would also impact the U.S. economy by the loss of these advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence products: “From Nvidia Corp. and Microsoft Corp. to OpenAI, the world’s AI frontrunners are increasingly turning to Taiwanese companies to fabricate their chips, build their servers and cool their devices. That in turn has made the island’s stock market the hottest major bourse in Asia over the past year, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. and Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.” [2]

China Surpasses the U.S. Navy

At the same time, the United States is facing a growing crisis in naval shipbuilding that has gotten so bad that the U.S. Navy can no longer rely on competent welding of vessels.

China has now surpassed the United States in total number of ships and has the largest Navy in the world.

In 2024, the Congressional Research Service reports that China is outpacing the United States Navy in new ships: “The… overall battle force [of China’s navy] is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of August 12, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.”[3]

On September 24, 2024, U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, admitted to Congress that there have been widespread welding failures that have impacted a number of U.S. Naval vessels:

“Last Tuesday, 24 September, I learned that Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) – Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) found potential deficiencies with welds on in-service and new construction U.S. Navy submarines and aircraft carriers …“[4]

The U.S. naval decline coincides with China becoming the world’s dominant commercial and naval shipbuilder which is also increasingly aggressive with its neighbors many of whom are also U.S. allies.

In addition, the U.S. Army is facing a shortfall from lack of investment in its watercraft fleet, according to a new report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress:

“The U.S. Army’s watercraft fleet is designed to carry supplies, vehicles, and people in deep ocean and shallow coastal waters, as well as provide access by water to remote, undeveloped areas.

Demand for Army watercraft is increasing, especially in the Indo-Pacific. However, the fleet has shrunk by about half since 2018. Moreover, the Army has struggled to maintain its watercraft and less than 40% of the fleet can perform its missions.

The Army is working on building new watercraft and setting a strategy to modernize the fleet. However, it hasn’t fully analyzed how to meet current and near-term needs.”[5]

Wanted: A U.S. Shipbuilding Mobilization

U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Torro has initiated efforts to establish a shipbuilding mobilization in collaboration with U.S. allies including Japan and South Korea.

That effort is supported by a collaboration of Republicans and Democrats who authored, Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy, warning that the United States maritime industry has suffered from “decades of neglect” allowing China to take the lead:

“Decades of neglect by the U.S. government and private industry has weakened our shipbuilding capacity and maritime workforce, contributing to a declining U.S.-flag shipping fleet to bring American goods to market and support the U.S. military during wartime. Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the merchant marine and maritime militia of the People’s Republic of China [PRC] outnumber the U.S. Navy. For decades, our country has failed to invest in critical maritime infrastructure and capabilities.”

One of the co-authors, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), explained: “The competition between the United States and Communist China will define the 21st century, and nowhere is this conflict more prevalent than in the maritime domain. The U.S. must move quickly to revitalize our maritime industrial base, reinvest in a robust workforce, and advance innovative technologies to project strength and security in the world’s waterways, oceans, and seas.”

For several years there have been efforts in Congress to enact a SHIPS Act, similar to the $52 billion investment in the CHIPS Act for U.S. semiconductor revitalization, to fund investments in new ships and shipbuilding in the United States.

The Republicans and Democrats who authored, Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy also advocates for collaboration with U.S. allies. They urge that the United States:

Prepare for resource competition in the Indo-Pacific and Polar regions with like-minded allies and partner countries. Review vulnerabilities to international maritime regulation, enforcement systems, and critical maritime infrastructure for global commerce.
Support a strong U.S. commercial maritime industry-both domestic and internationally-to leverage global supply chains the United States can access in peacetime, crisis, and war.
Establish allied and partner arrangements for combined presence operations to share the burden of providing freedom of navigation on the high seas, conducting maritime security operations, protecting ocean resources in critical regions, and potentially establishing green corridors and maritime opportunity zones.
Seek mutually beneficial relationships with treaty allies, exploring comparative advantages to lower cost, time, and the complexity of rebuilding America’s domestic shipping and shipbuilding industry.
Share the burden for critical maritime parts and projects, applying best practices from other industry supply chain models to the maritime sector.[6]

In October, two retired Navy captains, Jerry Hendrix, Senior Fellow at the Sagamore Institute and Brent Sadler the author of U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century, echoed this theme by calling for a major U.S. Navy and commercial fleet build-up and revitalization. Writing in the conservative National Review, they also argued for a U.S. collaboration with its allies:

“But state-led industrial policy alone will not suffice to outcompete the Chinese Communist Party’s nonmarket forces; also required is a market approach, in league with like-minded allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, that allows America to benefit from other nations’ comparative advantages even as it nurtures its own critical technologies. Within the first hundred days, the next president should establish an informal group of like-minded maritime nations — a maritime G-7.

Our nation has been in dire straits before, but it has always found a way to get ahead of our adversaries. The next president will need to act quickly to avert what could be a disastrous war with China in the next few years and prevent the ignobility of having domestic political decisions foisted on us by the economically coercive communist regime in Beijing. Committing to a maritime national-security strategy that will restore our naval and commercial fleets would allow us to influence events abroad and strengthen ourselves economically without necessarily becoming entangled in drawn-out wars. The United States was founded as a sea-power state. The first hundred days of the next administration provide a perfect chance to remember that fact.”[7]

Pacific Nations Impacted by China

Taiwan

The loss of democracy and independence for Taiwan would mean the loss of freedom for 24 million Taiwanese people.

China may be making its long-anticipated move to bring Taiwan under Chinese rule without resorting to an invasion or armed attack, according to Peter Enav the founder and editor of the Taiwan Strait Risk Report.

Enav spoke at the Los Angeles Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders Association (LACBFFA) webinar on July 31^st, 2024 where he said: “Is there another way of bringing Taiwan under Chinese control without risking the economic dislocation and the possible military difficulties involved in a blockade slash invasion of Taiwan? And in fact there is. This is the route they are traversing now and have been traversing for at least two or three years. We call this route the ‘gray zone’ short of war option. It is really about … ratcheting up economic and political pressure on Taiwan … that leads to a situation wherein the Taiwanese decide on their own volition to throw in the towel and bow to Chinese demands without a shot being fired.”[8]

Enav has noted that the parliamentary victory in January of the pro-China KMT party in Taiwan, supported by the eight-member parliamentary faction of Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) “ is set to superintend the torpedoing of virtually every meaningful Taiwanese military appropriations bill over at least the next four years, to say nothing of putting the kibosh on much needed military reform measures, like creating well-trained local militias within the framework of a thoroughly re-worked reserve system. The bottom line here is that U.S. hopes of using a re-invigorated Taiwan defense structure to help anchor a coalition of China-wary nations in the western Pacific have now gone down in flames.”[9]

U.S. Navy is Ill-Equipped to Defend Against Blockade

If China chooses to blockade Taiwan, the U.S. Navy is ill-equipped to respond according to a 2023 analysis published by the U.S. Naval War College entitled “Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan” by Lonnie D. Henley. Henley is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute who argues:

“If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have (emphasis added). Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war … Maneuvers by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in August 2022 marked the first time the PLA has openly signaled that a blockade of Taiwan is among the military courses of action for which it plans and trains. Chinese forces established closure areas near Taiwan’s major ports for what the Chinese media called “joint blockade and joint support operations.”[10]

Henley argues that the United States has not planned for the protracted struggle that would ensue if China blockaded Taiwan:

“The requirements for running a blockade differ markedly from those for defeating a landing. The latter has two key aspects: protecting U.S. ships and aircraft from China’s long-range weapons, and sinking as many as possible of the ships carrying Chinese forces across the (Taiwan) strait. Both tasks are extremely difficult, but the requirements are straightforward and play to the strengths of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Running a blockade, in contrast, presents extreme operational challenges for which the solution is not obvious, and furthermore runs contrary to deeply held beliefs about what kind of operations U.S. forces should prepare for. In order to succeed, U.S. Navy escorts must operate in a tightly constrained and fiercely contested battlespace west of Taiwan, protecting cargo ships and themselves from a wide variety of simultaneous threats. They must perform extensive mine clearing and obstacle removal under fire, with their backs to the Chinese coast; get the cargo ship into port and unloaded; then get it out again and safely away so that it does not become another obstacle. They must do this not once but repeatedly, many times per week, for as long as the conflict continues. This requires a different force structure and different operational concepts.”[11]

Henley further amplified on the difficulties facing the U.S. Navy at a debate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on October 5, 2023 where he noted deficiencies of the U.S. Navy in logistical resources and preparations to challenge a Chinese blockade of Taiwan:

“What we have no way to defeat at the moment is a close-in knife fight in the Taiwan Strait to keep any cargo ships from getting into Taiwan. Because at this point, the lack of long range weapons doesn’t matter because it’s a close-in fight, and the fight has to be on the west side of Taiwan, between Taiwan and China, not on the east side of Taiwan because the east coast ports are so small and the mountainous roads between them and the rest of Taiwan are so fragile that you are not going to get enough material through those east coast ports to keep Taiwan alive. Just cannot happen, physically impossible … So, you’ve got to come around to the west coast ports to get cargo … to keep Taiwan alive. And the military forces required to penetrate that blockade are completely different from the military forces that it took to stand back and sink amphibious landing ships from 500 miles out. And we have not built that force and we’re not even planning to build that force.”[12]

Mine Warfare

In June 2023, U.S. Navy Lieutenant (Junior Grade) A. J. Douglas argued, in an analysis published by the U.S. Naval Institute, that the United States is unprepared to counter the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s use of mines to support the blockade of Taiwan: Get Serious About Countering China’s Mine Warfare Advantage: In the event of conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. Navy would face a significant offensive mine threat from the People’s Liberation Army Navy:

“Since the early 2000s, the PLAN has assessed that “relative to other combat mission areas, [the U.S. Navy’s] mine warfare capabilities are extremely weak.” The PLAN has capitalized on this advantage by developing more extensive mine inventories and robust delivery methods than the U.S. Navy. China has an estimated 50,000–100,000 maritime mines (only Russia has more, perhaps some 125,000). In comparison, the U.S. Navy has fewer than 10,000 naval mines stockpiled, and most are the shallow-water Quickstrike general-purpose bomb-conversion weapons. China fields more than 30 different varieties of maritime mines. This diversity provides flexibility in the fuse type, mine type, and case depth required for a wide variety of missions.”

In the case of Taiwan, Douglas argues: “In a Taiwan scenario, China could use offensive mining to help blockade Taiwan and delay the interventions of the United States and other nations. Another realistic strategy is the offensive mining of key U.S. Navy ports in the Indo-Pacific region, such as those in Japan or Guam. These two scenarios would work in unison. For example, a Chinese National Defense University scholar stated that China could lay mines “in the enemy’s main ports and important channels . . . starting about 10 days before the blockade [would] go into effect.”[13]

The U.S. also trails behind China in minesweepers that will be essential to defend against a blockade, based on the number of mine countermeasures ships (MCM) listed below:

Comparison of Japanese, US, and Chinese MCM Hardware

The table below shows the number of MCM vessels held by China’s PLAN, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the US Navy as of August 2023.

Type/Country	China	Japan	United States
MCM vessels	40 +	21	8 (−8 in 2024)
Can control USVs	Included in above	4 + 18 (see note 7)	9 + 4 (see note 7)
USVs	15 +	+ (see note 7)	４
Total	55 +	25 + 18	17 − 4 13 (from 2024)
Ship type	Type 081A Type 082 I and II Type 529	Sugashima class Hatsushima class Awaji class FFM Mogami class	Avenger class Freedom class USV (excl. Independence class)

Table 1. MCM and Related Vessels Owned by Japan, the United States, and China[7]

As Table 1 shows, China already has more MCM vessels than either Japan or the United States. China began commissioning domestically produced MCM vessels in 1962 following the Korean War, but their capabilities were largely lost during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).The need to build up anti-mine capabilities after the Vietnam War led to the commissioning of Type 082 harbor minesweeper in 1987.New developments were halted due to defense budget cuts during the period of reform and opening up, though, and the Wochi-class Type 081 and Wozang-class Type 082 I/II vessels were not commissioned until 2005. The PLAN has since been modernizing its fleet by decommissioning older ships and building new-generation vessels. More than 15 unmanned surface vessels (USVs) are already in service, greatly surpassing in quantity and quality those held by Japan and the United States.

(Source: https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/kawakami_03.html)

Taiwan Prepares for a Blockade

According to an October Reuters report, the Taiwan government is stockpiling rice and other crucial supplies in preparation for a blockade and attacks on ports by China:

“In a report to parliament about preparations in case of a Chinese blockade, a copy of which was reviewed by Reuters, Taiwan’s agriculture ministry said it has ensured that rice stock piles were above a three-month level as required by law and that food supplies were stored across the island in a bid to “lower attack risks.” The ministry said Taiwan’s current rice stocks were enough to support the island for at least seven months and plans on rice rationing through supply stations across the island were being made in case of a food crisis. During a blockade, more farmland will be used to grow rice, the ministry said, adding it will also prioritise growing sweet potatoes, soy beans and fresh vegetables as well as using more ponds for aquaculture. In a scenario in which sea fishing is not allowed, the ministry said the island’s fish feed inventory will be enough to support fishing in ponds for more than three months. The ministry said it was planning to set up a task force to ensure food supply safety by taking a monthly inventory of the island’s food resources.”[14]

The threat of China’s successful blockade or takeover of Taiwan would severely threaten freedom of the seas for East Asia, the security of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and severely impact U.S. trade with Asia. There could also be threats to Guam and other Pacific islands that could also impact Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. West Coast.

Other Conflict Areas

Vietnam

In the South China Sea, China’s aggressive policing of disputed territory with Vietnam has produced the latest clash in a long, complex relationship, according to The New York Times.

The report warns that if China succeeds and bullies Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries into submission, China would effectively own one of the most important waterways for global trade, giving it the power to disrupt supply chains and punish countries that do not fall in line with its demands, and also mine for resources below the ocean floor.[15]

On October 10^th, the U.S. Naval Institute News reported: “An incident in the South China Sea last month saw 10 Vietnamese fishermen beaten by officers from China’s Maritime Safety Administration near the Paracel Islands, according to local media. The Vietnamese accounts allege that Maritime Safety Administration vessels 101 and 301 from the Sansha City United Law Enforcement Unit surrounded the civilian vessel on the morning of September 29, 2024. Three rubber hulled inflated boats were deployed by the Chinese patrol ships to board the fishing vessel, which was attempting to escape.”[16]

In October, The New York Times reported that a fisherman, Nguyen Thanh Bien was still dealing with internal injuries two weeks after the Chinese authorities boarded his fishing boat and bashed him with iron pipes in a patch of the South China Sea claimed by both China and Vietnam: “I got hit first in the head from behind — I was running to the front of the boat … With the second blow, I lost consciousness.” When he awoke, his catch, worth nearly $8,000, was gone. His ribs were broken. And three other crew members were injured.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that its law enforcement officers had hurt anyone while stopping a boat that it said was fishing illegally near the Paracel Islands. But the violence, described in interviews, insurance claims and letters to the Vietnamese government, fit a pattern: China has already used water cannons, boat-ramming, ship-sinking and lasers in its effort to assert dominance over the South China Sea. It also held a bombing exercise in the Gulf of Tonkin, issuing an “entering prohibited” warning for waters 75 miles from Vietnam’s coast.[17]

In July, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious warship allegedly rammed two Vietnamese fishing vessels operating near the disputed Spratly Islands, according to local press cited in an Office of Naval Intelligence report.[18]

The beatings and military operations, which closely followed more extensive drills around Taiwan, occurred less than a month after Vietnam’s new leader, To Lam, met with President Biden in New York. He had gone first to Beijing, and some analysts suggested that China was expanding its intimidation tactics to scare Hanoi and others away from Washington and alliances with neighbors.

“It shows that China may be harder on the new Vietnamese leadership going forward in the South China Sea,” said Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. “It also shows that the new Vietnamese leadership does not have much space to further accommodate China,” according to The New York Times.[19]

So while the Philippines, facing its own conflicts with China, has begun to document and publicize almost every perceived act of Chinese bullying in disputed waters, Vietnam has been more selective. In June, a fishing boat and its crew from Mr. Bien’s village, Chau Thuan Bien, about 80 miles south of Danang, disappeared after reporting by radio an encounter with the Chinese authorities.[20]

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post noted: “Why Beijing takes a low-key approach to Vietnam but not the Philippines … Manila’s alliance with the US may be one reason China is taking a much tougher stance, but Hanoi’s island-building could still be a problem.”[21]

Philippines

Under the leadership of President Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines have defended their territorial waters as China has stepped up its presence in contested waters of the South China Sea.

To add to Marcos’ problems, Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte has resigned from her cabinet post and is distancing herself from Marcos’ policies including his defense of territorial waters in the South China Sea. Duterte could be the candidate to support Beijing and oppose the United States in the next presidential election.

However she faces some hurdles, according to a June 24th report in the South China Morning Post: “But her progress could be impeded by previous controversies, including allegations surrounding her past use of public funds and her silence on maritime tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea, according to Sherwin Ona, an associate professor of political science at De La Salle University in Manila: “It remains to be seen if she can fashion herself as one [an opposition figure] given her political baggage,” he said, citing “her pro-Beijing stance”, “allegations of corruption related to intelligence funds” and the pending International Criminal Court case against her father’s deadly war on drugs.”[22]

On June 19^th, the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs said: “The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on Wednesday denounced the “illegal and aggressive actions” of the Chinese near the Ayungin Shoal on June 17, which severely injured a Philippine Navy personnel and damaged Filipino vessels. In a statement, the DFA expressed “grave concern” over the incident that happened during a humanitarian mission to the BRP Sierra Madre. Before the incident, the agency lamented the Philippines had been working to “rebuild a conducive environment for dialogue and consultation” with China on the South China Sea. “This cannot be achieved if China’s words do not match their actions on the waters …”[23]

On July 2nd, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said that China’s largest Coast Guard vessel had anchored in Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, and is meant to intimidate its smaller Asian neighbor. The Chinese Coast Guard’s 165-meter ‘monster ship’ entered Manila’s 200-nautical mile EEZ, Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the PCG, told a news conference.[24]

However on July 21, 2024, the Philippines said it has “reached an understanding” with China on resupply missions to a beached Filipino naval ship that has been a key flashpoint between the two countries in the South China Sea. The Chinese foreign ministry confirmed the “temporary arrangement” with the two sides agreeing to jointly manage maritime differences and de-escalate the situation in the South China Sea, according to a Guardian report.[25]

The Chinese foreign ministry confirmed the arrangement, adding: “The Chinese side still demands that the Philippine side tow away the ship and restore the original status of [Second Thomas Shoal] as if it were unmanned and without facilities,” a spokesperson said in a statement released early on Monday. “If the Philippines needs to provide supplies to the ship’s occupants before the Philippines tows away the beached warship, the Chinese side is willing to allow the Philippine side to carry out the transportation and replenishment on humanitarian grounds,” the spokesperson said.

On July 22, 2024, Philippine foreign ministry spokesperson Teresita Daza said in a statement that Manila would “continue to assert our rights and jurisdiction in our maritime zones”, which included Second Thomas Shoal. The foreign ministry also rejected suggestions by China that the “provisional arrangement” announced on Sunday required Manila to give Beijing “prior notification” and verification of deliveries to the BRP Sierra Madre, reports Agence France-Presse.

On May 3, 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Philippine Secretary of the Department of National Defense Carlito Galvez established the Bilateral Defense Guidelines to modernize alliance cooperation in service of the United States and the Philippines. The guidelines reaffirm that “an armed attack in the Pacific, including anywhere in the South China Sea, on either of their public vessels, aircraft, or armed forces – which includes their Coast Guards – would invoke mutual defense commitments under Articles IV and V of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”[26]

Reuters reported on July 5th that the Philippines has turned down offers from the United States to assist operations in the South China Sea, after a flare-up with China over missions to resupply Filipino troops on a contested shoal, its military chief said. The US, a treaty ally, has offered support but Manila prefers to handle operations on its own, Armed Forces Chief General Romeo Brawner told Reuters: “Yes, of course, they have been offering help and they asked us how they could help us in any way,” he said. “We try to exhaust all possible options that we have before we ask for help.” Manila and Washington are bound by the 1951-Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).”[27]

South Korea

China and its ally, North Korea, pose a growing threat to South Korea according to a recent report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):

”The growth of North Korea (DPRK)’s weapon of mass destruction (WMD) program, kinetic and lethal provocations put lives at risk both in the initial action and any follow-up responses. Recent repeated launches of waste material into South Korea (ROK) by North Korea and DPRK’s recent threats warning of military responses to alleged ROK drones sending pamphlets into Pyongyang have resulted in an exchange of threats between the two Koreas that has drawn international attention. Could this be the escalation on the eve of the U.S. presidential election that has been a concern? Or is this the harbinger of something much more serious, even if a few years down the road?”[28]

The deployment of North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine has South Korea worried as a Carnegie Endowment report explains:

“For its part, South Korea is concerned that North Korea’s military involvement in Ukraine could both legitimize Pyongyang’s weapons program and provide combat experience that could later threaten South Korean security. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that the use of North Korean troops in Ukraine violates United Nations precedent, including recent UN General Assembly resolutions condemning military cooperation with both Russia and North Korea’s weapons proliferation. The ministry said it would work with the international community to respond to “acts that threaten our core security interests.” It further warned that the participation of a third nation in the Ukraine conflict risks triggering a global war, given the complex web of security alliances and the potential for escalation beyond Ukraine’s borders.”[29]

Japan

Nikkei Asia reported that the U.S. Defense Department’s ambition to use allied factories and shipyards to supplement an overstretched American industrial base in countering China has hit a stumbling block as Japan enters a period of political uncertainty following Japan’s recent general election.

The Nikkei report added that Japan’s ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito lost its majority for the first time in 15 years, leaving Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba scrambling to find the votes to be reappointed prime minister on Nov. 11, when the parliament convenes for a special session: “The LDP defeat “brings all of the problems associated with trying to put a coalition together, especially because the parties that gained seats have quite a different agenda,” William Schneider, a senior fellow at the conservative think tank Hudson Institute, told Nikkei Asia.

The Democratic Party for the People (DPP), which quadrupled its seats and is widely seen to hold the deciding vote going forward, says in its policy platform that Japan is “overly dependent on the U.S.” for defense, the Japanese news service explained.[30]

Already, Japan’s next government faces an headache on defense policy:” It must deal with an ambitious but stalled plan, worth nearly $400 billion when it was launched, to ramp up defense spending significantly at a time of security tensions against a backdrop of war in Ukraine, China’s increasingly aggressive military posture in Asia and growing doubts over North Korea’s next steps,” according to a Nikkei Asia report.[31]

In June, Nikkei Asia also reported that Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines are part of a three front aggression in which China is pursuing ”gray zone” aggression that is short of actual conflict but “part of a three-pronged maritime threat that is unnerving Beijing’s neighbors. The increased hostility is currently focused on the Senkakus, Scarborough Shoal off the Philippines, and Taiwan’s Kinmen islands.”[32]

The Nikkei report goes on to explain:

All three island groups are claimed by China. The three locations are all in the so-called ‘First island chain’ — a group of islands, including Taiwan, Okinawa and the Philippines, which is the first chain of major Pacific archipelagos off the East Asian continental mainland coast, and which China sees as its first line of defense.
The Senkakus, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, have for decades been a source of friction between Tokyo and Beijing. Japan’s Foreign Ministry says they are “an inherent part of the territory of Japan” and there is no issue of territorial sovereignty. Beijing says the islands are its inherent territory.
According to Japan Coast Guard data, China has been steadily sending more coast guard vessels into Japanese territorial waters and the contiguous zone around the Senkakus, prompting Tokyo to increase its own patrols. In 2023, a record 1,287 Chinese vessels operated in the contiguous zone on 352 days of the year, the Japanese data shows.
Japan said it had spotted Chinese ships near the islands for a record number of consecutive days.[33]

Other Conflict Areas in the Pacific

Australia

On June 17th, relations between China and Australia, strained by years of acrimony, were reported “on the right track,” by Chinese Premier Li Qiang … during an appearance with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who emphasized “renewed and revitalized” engagement between the two countries. Li, President Xi Jinping’s second-in-command, was in Australia for a four-day trip that marks the first by a Chinese premier since his predecessor Li Keqiang’s visit seven years ago.

According to Nikkei Asia: “China in 2020 hit Australia with $20 billion Australian dollars ($13.2 billion) worth of trade restrictions after taking umbrage with former prime minister Scott Morrison’s call for an independent probe into the origins of COVID-19. Most of those barriers, including high tariffs on Australian wine and barley, as well as restrictions on timber, coal and copper, have been removed in recent months, although curbs on rock lobster exports and two beef exporters remain.”[34]

The trip follows an effort to “stabilize” the relationship, which nosedived under Australia’s previous government and still faces pressure amid increasing geopolitical tension in the region between China and Western nations.

Peru

In June, President Dina Boluarte’s government admitted that the Peruvian government has backed off efforts to exert control and sovereignty over a $1.3 billion mega port being built by a Chinese state-owned company on Peru’s Pacific coast. China Ocean Shipping Company, (COSCO) has been building the Chancay port near Lima and expecting to be its exclusive operator. Bloomberg explained: “But (Peruvian) government lawyers sued to challenge that status earlier this year, saying the facility should be available to other companies offering services such as loading and unloading shipping containers. The surprise lawsuit was criticized by the company, Chinese lenders and Peruvian industry groups that argued virtually all other ports in the South American country have exclusive operators. President Dina Boluarte’s government now says the lawsuit will be dropped. The Chancay port is expected to transform trade between South America and Asia by slashing travel times for cargo ships. The facility … has become a lightning rod for US-China tensions in the region …”[35]

Privately, one ocean carrier representative is worried that the new port will not only give China’s COSCO more control over Asian trade with South American countries but it could also be followed by the establishment of a Chinese naval base located within a short sailing distance of the Panama Canal.[36]

That concern was re-enforced by a senior U.S. Army general as reported by the Financial Times :” Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to inaugurate the $1.3bn Chancay port on the Pacific coast when he visits Peru for a summit in mid-November, amid growing concerns among US security officials that the facility’s size, depth and strategic location make it suitable to host Chinese warships. China’s Cosco Shipping, which has been building the port with a local junior partner, will be the sole operator when it opens after Peru dropped a lawsuit challenging its exclusive status. “It could be used as a dual-use facility, it’s a deepwater port,” said General Laura Richardson, outgoing chief of US Southern Command, which covers Latin America and the Caribbean. “[The navy] could use it, absolutely . . . this is a playbook that we’ve seen play out in other places, not just in Latin America.” Twenty-two Latin American and Caribbean countries have signed up to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s hallmark project to build infrastructure abroad, as China expands its footprint in a region once labelled as the “backyard” of the US. China is now the biggest trading partner for South America and a major investor in critical minerals, transport and energy projects.” (See: https://www.ft.com/content/f6589d13-6014-47d0-8cc5-e98a0b7ad0bc)

Mexico

Mexican drug cartels import chemicals from China through Mexican ports that are manufactured into fentanyl and methamphetamines in Mexico and then transported into the United States at border crossings in Arizona, California and Texas, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

This is happening as drug seizures have increased at ports on Mexico’s West Coast, as enforcement agencies fight for control of ports under the control of drug cartels, according to a July report in SupplyChainBrain.[37]

To add urgency to the crisis, P&I Services Mexico issued an alert on July 11th warning: “P&I Services Mexico informs that as of July 2024, there has been a sudden increase of narcotics related incidents in Mexican West Coast Ports. The current trend points towards a LatAm trade, which is the usual trade affecting narcotics incidents in Mexico. The narcotics have been mostly found inside containers or inside the vessel’s sea chest. If narcotics are found by the crew or another, adequate legal representation is of the utmost importance as well as immediate reporting of the same.”[38]

Killing Americans

In May, the DEA’s 2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), provided “highlights the dangerous shift from plant-based drugs to synthetic drugs. This shift has resulted in the most dangerous and deadly drug crisis the United States has ever faced. These synthetic drugs, such as fentanyl and methamphetamine, are responsible for nearly all of the fatal drug poisonings in our nation. ”[39]

There were an estimated 74,702 Americans who died from “Synthetic Opioids (fentanyl)” in 2023 and an estimated 36,251 U.S. deaths from “Psychostimulants (including methamphetamine)” according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control.[40]

The DEA report does stipulate that the drug trade is occurring despite opposition from the governments of Mexico, China and the United States.

In her introduction to the report, DEA Administrator Anne Milgram warned about the growing threat created by Mexican drug cartels who import chemicals from China via Mexican ports and produce the drugs in labs in Mexico:

“The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels are at the heart of this crisis. These two Cartels are global criminal enterprises that have developed global supply chain networks. They rely on chemical companies and pill press companies in China to supply the precursor chemicals and pill presses needed to manufacture the drugs. They operate clandestine labs in Mexico where they manufacture these drugs, and then utilize their vast distribution networks to transport the drugs into the United States. They rely on associates in the United States to distribute the drugs at a retail level on the streets and on social media. Finally, the Cartels utilize Chinese Money Laundering Organizations to move their profits from the United States back to Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations based in Mexico and South America are increasingly utilizing China based underground banking systems as their primary money laundering mechanism.”[41]

Impact on U.S. Ports

This is also happening as Mexican ports are attracting more container business from China that may be impacting U.S. ports. In May, Daniel Hackett of Hackett Associates, which produces the monthly “Global Port Tracker” report for the National Retail Federation (NRF) noted a rise in truckloads of Chinese imports coming in through Mexico: “There is a large volume of cargo coming in from China into Mexico and then being trucked across the border. If you look at … the first quarter of 2024 at Laredo (Texas), they had almost a doubling of the number of … loaded trucks with containers or loaded container trucks crossing the border to about 1.2 million in the first quarter. So, if that trend continues, that might be … stunting the growth … at some of the other (U.S.) ports where those imports from China typically occur.”[42]

Evading U.S. Tariffs?

In October, SupplyChainBrain reported on a Vesselbot report warning that Chinese shipments through Mexican ports also might evade U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods as they pass through Mexico and get trucked into the United States: “According to a report from logistics intelligence company Vesselbot, twenty-foot-equivalent (TEU) container volumes from China into Mexico increased by more than 61% between January and June of 2024, in addition to a 64% year-over-year increase in January.”

“This sharp change has sparked concerns that Mexico might be acting as an alternative for Chinese goods to enter the U.S., bypassing the high tariffs imposed as part of the trade conflict between the U.S. and China,” Vesselbot’s report reads.

The report noted that in 2018, then-President Donald Trump imposed 30-50% tariffs on Chinese-made washing machines and solar panels, followed by additional levies on steel, aluminum and a variety of consumer goods. President Biden has largely kept those measures intact, while adding new tariffs on electric vehicles, semiconductors, batteries, ship-to-shore cranes and medical products, and boosting existing tariffs on steel, aluminum and solar cells.

Vesselbot’s data “shows that, between 2023 and 2024, Mexico’s Manzanillo Ensenada and Lazaro Cardenas ports, the shipping hubs that handle a large portion of the country’s imports from China, have seen record-breaking container volumes. At Manzanillo, TEU import volumes from China increased by 40% between January and June 2024, while Lazaro Cardenas saw a 200% increase over that same period. Vesselbot also tracked what it describes as a “massive” drop in containerized exports from China to the U.S. within that same period, dipping by roughly 18% between January and February.”[43]

CONCLUSION

The next president of the United States must make defense of the Pacific a top national security priority or face the consequences of a national security and economic disaster:

In the Pacific, the United States should establish military sealift terminals at ports in Hawaii, Alaska and the U.S. West Coast.
The United States must increase support for South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines now even if that means withdrawing assets from the Middle East.
The United States should begin immediate discussions with its allies to defend against a blockade of Taiwan by focusing on the deployment of a joint sealift effort to Taiwan with Taiwanese, Japanese, Korean and U.S. carriers. That effort should also explore how to land supplies at small ports at Eastern Taiwan. Increased stockpiling of non-perishables should also be considered.
The United States should begin discussions with its allies to fast-track construction of small 1,000 + TEU container ships to be built in new shipyards in the United States. For now, the vessels can used for U.S. coastal and Jones Act trades via the Marine Highway program and subsequently be deployed in a military sealift capacity if necessary. These vessels should be built in new U.S. shipyards at available sites in the West, Gulf, East Coasts and the Great Lakes. The shipyards should utilize modern technologies and practices and enlist Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese companies to manage operations and train a new generation of U.S. shipbuilders. Financing can be made through a revised U.S. Maritime Administration Title XI loan guarantee program that fast tracks loans for ships and shipyards that will be guaranteed by the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command.
The United States should approve Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel to increase U.S. steel production for all steel products including new ships and new production for offshore wind turbines and farms planned for the East and West Coasts.
The United States should support Japanese and South Korean companies’ efforts to build new ship to shore cranes in the United States so as to upgrade U.S. port facilities and provide a competitor market to Chinese cranes.
The United States should go to the United Nations and demand that freedom of the seas be invoked for all nations in the South China Sea and support for all Asian nations impacted by China’s incursions there.
The United States should extend support to all East Asian nations that might be threatened by Chinese aggression including Australia and New Zealand.
Nearer to home, U.S. Customs and Border Protection should be immediately deployed with additional assets to scrutinize truck shipments coming into the United States from Mexico to stem the flow of products that might be evading U.S. tariffs as well as illegal drugs. In addition, more U.S. assets need to be deployed to shut down drug smuggling coming in from across the U.S. border.
Finally, the United States should begin a dialogue with Peru to seek assurances that no Chinese naval base will be built on Peruvian soil.

Naval and Shipbuilding Mobilization

U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Torro has initiated efforts to establish a shipbuilding collaboration with U.S. allies including Japan and South Korea.

The Republicans and Democrats who authored, Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy also advocate for collaboration with U.S. allies.

They further advocate that the United States:

Support a strong U.S. commercial maritime industry-both domestic and internationally-to leverage global supply chains the United States can access in peacetime and in war.
Prepare for resource competition in the Indo-Pacific and Polar regions with like-minded allies and partner countries. Review vulnerabilities to international maritime regulation, enforcement systems, and critical maritime infrastructure for global commerce.

Establish allied and partner arrangements for combined presence operations to share the burden of providing freedom of navigation on the high seas, conducting maritime security operations, protecting ocean resources in critical regions, and potentially establishing green corridors and maritime opportunity zones.
Seek mutually beneficial relationships with treaty allies, exploring comparative advantages to lower cost, time, and the complexity of rebuilding America’s domestic shipping and shipbuilding industry.
Share the burden for critical maritime parts and projects, applying best practices from other industry supply chain models to the maritime sector.

In October, two retired Navy captains, Jerry Hendrix a senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute and Brent Sadler the author of U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century, echoed this theme by calling for a major U.S. Navy and commercial fleet build-up and revitalization:

“Our nation has been in dire straits before, but it has always found a way to get ahead of our adversaries. The next president will need to act quickly to avert what could be a disastrous war with China in the next few years and prevent the ignobility of having domestic political decisions foisted on us by the economically coercive communist regime in Beijing. Committing to a maritime national-security strategy that will restore our naval and commercial fleets would allow us to influence events abroad and strengthen ourselves economically without necessarily becoming entangled in drawn-out wars. The United States was founded as a sea-power state. The first hundred days of the next administration provide a perfect chance to remember that fact.”

FOOTNOTES

[1] https://www.hudson.org/technology/losing-taiwan-semiconductor-would-devastate-us-economy-riley-walters

[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-30/how-ai-s-1-3-trillion-future-increasingly-hinges-on-taiwan

[3] https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33153.html

[4] https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25194942-241003-secnav-letters-to-congress-on-welds

[5] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106387

[6] https://www.ajot.com/insights/full/ai-bipartisan-national-maritime-strategy-warns-u.s-is-far-behind-china

[7] https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2024/12/a-plan-to-restore-the-navy-for-trumps-first-hundred-days/

[8] https://rbtus.com/china-move-on-taiwan-may-be-near-taiwan-risk-analyst/

[9] https://rbtus.com/china-move-on-taiwan-may-be-near-taiwan-risk-analyst/

[10] https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=cmsi-maritime-reports, p.1 also https://chinapower.csis.org/chinas-power-up-for-debate-2023/

[11] Ibid