By Kevin Policarpo
With the number of high-profile airplane crashes in the U.S. since January 2025, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is now under extreme pressure to rebuild the nation’s outdated air traffic control system. The FAA has estimated that the cost of upgrading the system will cost the federal government $35 billion through 2030.[1]
On January 29th, over the Potomac River outside Ronald Reagan National Airport, a military Black Hawk helicopter collided with an American Airlines regional jet, killing 67 people.[2]
Another deadly crash happened on January 31st, where a “… small medical jet carrying a child patient crashed into a Philadelphia neighborhood. Seven people died, including all six on board the plane and another in a car on the ground.”[3]
The FAA has been struggling for years with an aging system. The January crashes have brought public attention to the problem and prompted calls for addressing the obsolete system.
Acting FAA Administrator Chris Rocheleau stated: “It’s long past time when we need to fix this problem…”[4]
The FAA requested funding “…to purchase new radios, network connections and replace 618 radars, install anti-collision tarmac technology at 200 airports, build six new air traffic control centers and expand its ADS-B network (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) of real-time aircraft traffic information.”[5]
In 2023, in a prelude to the 2025 air traffic control breakdown, the General Accounting Office, (GAO), which is the investigative arm of Congress, noted how the system broke down and caused a major halt to air traffic operations:
“On January 11, 2023, the system became temporarily unavailable to users. To ensure safety, FAA grounded all departing aircraft for about 2 hours to fix the system. The outage caused over 1,300 flight cancellations and almost 10,000 flight delays throughout the day. Some airlines took several days to fully recover.”[6]
U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy unveiled a plan to ask Congress for billions of dollars to upgrade air traffic control. The plan includes: upgrading outdated radar and telecommunications systems, air traffic control towers and other facilities as well as increasing staffing of air traffic controllers.[7]
Duffy explained: “‘The system we have here is not worth saving… We actually have to build a brand new state-of-the-art air traffic control system… We let this go far too long.’”[8]
Duffy was joined by five CEOs from major airlines and aircraft companies such as Boeing and Airbus. He has not set a precise amount for the massive overhaul, but previously estimated that it may cost “tens of billions of dollars.”[9]
Duffy has also spoken with companies that are involved in the ATC overhaul, including Verizon CEO Hans Vestberg on reform efforts which have made improvements.
Back in 2023, Verizon won a $2.4 billion contract from the FAA to replace outdated telecommunications equipment.[10]
Duffy stated that he needs additional funding for airport equipment to prevent near-miss incidents and provide incentives for hiring new air traffic controllers and retaining current employees. The latter need is important as the FAA noted that they were 3,500 employees short of their staffing targets.[11]
At the unveiling, airline companies have called for at least $31 billion in spending, with a U.S. House panel proposing: $12.5 billion in initial spending on air traffic control reform, including $2.5 billion for air traffic tower and contract-tower replacements.[12]
Staffing Shortfalls Newark Airport Heralds a Looming Problem
New Jersey’s Newark Airport is dealing with a multitude of problems. On May 12th, according to Flight Aware: the airport already cancelled 82 flights on Monday and announced 64 delays.[13]
At a time when the Trump Administration has been eliminating federal jobs, staffing shortfalls with air traffic controllers has been a serious complication.
On May 13th, The Guardian reported that Newark had only three air traffic controllers at their station on Monday, May 12th, which is less than the 14 that are required for day-to-day operations.[14] This staffing shortfall is the latest problem that Newark has experienced in little over a week which included: three communications blackouts, rendering the control tower unable to track or communicate with planes for up to 90 seconds.[15]
According to an article published by The Verge on May 25th, 2025, the issues facing Newark stared making news on April 28th, when pilots lost contact with Newark Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), which oversees approaching and departing aircraft from the airport’s airspace. It took three tries for the pilots to contact TRACON before they did reestablish contact.
Moments later, Newark Airport’s radar went dark. With the loss of radar and unsure if they could maintain comms with pilots, “…Newark’s controllers did what they were trained to do — get everyone to a safe holding place until the situation stabilized.”[16]
Newark’s controllers lost radio and radar for around a minute and a half before the backup systems came on. Due to the controller’s actions, no airplanes crashed or had a near miss. However, airport operations did not resume for the rest of the afternoon, with planes not taking off until 5 PM. The outage caused a dozen flights to be cancelled “…and 30 others were diverted to nearby airports.”[17]
On February 1st, 2025, Newsweek published further details on the lower air traffic control staffing numbers:
“Data from the union representing controllers shows that 285 of the country’s 313 air traffic control facilities operate below FAA recommended staffing levels. That amounts to more than 90 percent of the country’s air traffic control facilities. At 73 of those facilities, staffing is so low that at least a quarter of the workforce is missing.”[18]
The New York region in particular has been severely impacted by the staffing shortage, with two key facilities on Long Island (which manage air traffic at Newark, J.F.K, and LaGuardia) operating with almost 40% of its positions vacant.[19]
In addition, the FAA’s data also noted a shortage of fully qualified ATC staff. It takes years of training to produce a fully qualified ATC operator. A 2023 Inspector General report noted that the pandemic caused extended certification times and caused older air traffic controllers to retire.
The FAA’s data stated that by September 2023, “…only about 70 percent of staffing targets at airport towers and terminal approach facilities nationwide were met by fully certified controllers. When including controllers in training, the figure increased to approximately 79 percent.”[20]
During an interview on NBC on Sunday, May 11th, Secretary Duffy stated “…that ‘the lights are blinking, the sirens are turning’ throughout the whole system.”[21] He also stated: “What you see in Newark is gonna happen in other places across the country…”[22]
Duffy has stated that he wants to raise the mandatory retirement age for air traffic controllers to 61 years to combat staffing issues.[23]
An Associated Press article published on February 17th, 2025, noted that the staffing shortfall was compounded by the firing of hundreds of FAA employees by the Trump Administration, including “…personnel hired for FAA radar, landing and navigational aid maintenance…”[24]
GAO Report on Air Traffic Control
Heather Krause, GAO Managing Director of Physical Infrastructure, gave testimony on March 4th, 2025 before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives on the delays and roadblocks hampering modernization efforts:
“My statement today discusses the results of our recent reports examining FAA’s maintenance and modernization of the U.S. air traffic control system. Specifically, this statement describes (1) the sustainability of FAA’s air traffic control systems, and FAA’s efforts to manage and oversee system modernization; (2) FAA’s status and challenges implementing NextGen; and (3) actions needed to improve FAA’s modernization efforts. It draws primarily from our September 2024 report on the condition of numerous IT systems that FAA uses for air traffic control (ATC) and our November 2023 report on FAA’s NextGen program. Detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for this work can be found in the issued reports.”[25]
“The U.S. national airspace system (NAS) handles more than 45,000 flights per day, and FAA’s mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of traffic in the national airspace. In addition to FAA, key aviation stakeholders—airlines, airports, general aviation, business aviation, aircraft manufacturers, and aviation professionals—work together to help ensure these results.”[26]
However, the ATC system is aging and facing several challenges “…including the unavailability of parts and retirement of technicians with expertise in maintaining the aging systems. In addition, there has been dramatic growth in airspace demand since the older systems were initially implemented.”[27]
These challenges can impact the FAA’s ability to carry out its operations. One vital system for airspace operations is the Notice to Airmen system “…which enables air traffic controllers to provide real-time updates to aircraft crew about critical flying situations relating to weather, air traffic congestion, and safety…”[28]
A November 2023 GAO report stated that since 2018, the FAA’s progress in its decades-long effort to modernize air traffic control (which began in 1982) under the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) has been mixed:
“Across four critical program areas GAO assessed (e.g., navigation and communications), FAA met some milestones for deploying systems but missed others, some by several years.”[29] The delays increased by several years due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The same November GAO report stated NextGen’s cost at the time: “In November 2023, we reported that FAA had spent over $14 billion on NextGen from fiscal years 2007 through 2022.[30]
In 2018, the FAA projected that “…NextGen would cost the federal government and industry at least $35 billion through 2030.”[31]
Unsustainable Systems and FAA Oversight Gaps
In January, 2023 the FAA conducted an operational risk assessment to evaluate the sustainability of the current ATC systems. The assessment discovered the following:
“The assessment determined that of its 138 systems, 51 (37 percent) were unsustainable, and 54 (39 percent) were potentially unsustainable… Of the 105 unsustainable or potentially unsustainable systems, 73 were deployed over 20 years ago, with 40 being deployed over 30 years ago, and six of those deployed over 60 years ago.
Also, of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems, 58 had critical operational impacts on the safety and efficiency of the national airspace… These 58 systems are comprised equally of unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems (29 each). FAA also reported that of the 105 unsustainable and potentially unsustainable systems, 74 systems (70 percent) face one or more challenges that are historically problematic of aging systems. These challenges include no longer meeting mission needs, difficulty finding spare parts for the systems, and limited technical staff with expertise in repairing the aging system.”[32]
The GAO reported back in 2023 that the FAA faces challenges to implement NextGen as the U.S. airspace system continues to evolve. The report team interviewed FAA officials and stakeholders, who cited a range of challenges that will continue to hamper the program including the following:
“ Unanticipated events. FAA and stakeholders recognized the need for the agency to be agile in responding to unanticipated events, like COVID-19, moving forward. FAA’s experience during and after the pandemic showed, more broadly, that revising NextGen plans and implementation schedules in the wake of such events can be particularly challenging due to the interdependencies of many NextGen systems (e.g., schedule delays for one system cause delays for other systems).
Funding concerns. FAA and stakeholders have raised concerns about funding for air traffic modernization efforts. Industry stakeholders have recently called for additional funds to expedite the modernization of the NAS and to exempt FAA from government shutdowns to ensure a predictable funding stream. One stakeholder told us that FAA’s budget requests for implementing NextGen have not kept up with the growing costs of materials and labor over time…
Varying aircraft equipage. NextGen capabilities depend on aircraft operators to install new avionics to realize benefits, such as flying more precise, fuel-efficient routes. FAA officials told us that, as of various points from September 2022 to April 2023, operators had achieved mixed levels of equipage for certain navigation, communications, and surveillance avionics. Mixed equipage can lead to operational inefficiencies. For example, aircraft not equipped with advanced avionics for navigation can cause slowdowns at certain airport hubs, even for aircraft that are equipped, since controllers must use procedures that align with each aircraft’s equipage.
Changing national airspace. FAA faces several other challenges, such as cybersecurity risks, posed by a more internet-based, interconnected NAS; the integration of new airspace entrants (such as drones and commercial spacecraft); and potential spectrum interference from wider use of the fifth generation of mobile communication networks (5G), which could potentially interfere with aircraft navigation systems.”[33]
FAA Actions to Addressing Aging Systems and Improving ATC Modernization
The GAO’s work on the condition of legacy IT systems and the FAA’s overall modernization efforts yielded 11 recommendations for improvement. These recommendations are critical to helping the FAA manage risks and modernize ATC systems and address unsustainable systems.
The FAA agreed with the GAO recommendations but hasn’t taken action to address them. Acting on both recommendations “…would help FAA take a holistic look at the risks facing airspace modernization, and would better position FAA to systematically identify and assess a range of risk response options guided by the level of risk it is willing to accept. It would also better position FAA to explain the highest programmatic risks it is facing to Congress and other decision-makers and why its selected risk mitigation was the best approach. These actions would also promote transparency, ensuring Congress has information on how FAA is mitigating risks related to critical ATC systems.”[34]
FOOTNOTES
[1]https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-108162/index.html?_gl=1*194bm3h*_ga*MjU4NTk1OTIuMTc0NjgxMTY3Mw..*_ga_V393SNS3SR*czE3NDY4MTE2NzIkbzEkZzAkdDE3NDY4MTE2NzUkajAkbDAkaDA
[2]https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2025/02/19/plane-crashes-2025-arizona-washington-alaska-philadelphia/79226638007/
[3] Ibid.How many plane crashes have there been in 2025? How many people have died?
[4]https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-transportation-chief-call-overhaul-air-traffic-control-system-2025-05-08/
[5] Ibid.
[6]https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-108162/index.html?_gl=1*194bm3h*_ga*MjU4NTk1OTIuMTc0NjgxMTY3Mw..*_ga_V393SNS3SR*czE3NDY4MTE2NzIkbzEkZzAkdDE3NDY4MTE2NzUkajAkbDAkaDA
[7]https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-transportation-chief-call-overhaul-air-traffic-control-system-2025-05-08/
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] https://qz.com/newark-airport-cancels-more-flights-sean-duffy-warning-1851780238
[14] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/13/newark-airport-air-traffic-controllers
[15] Ibid.
[16] https://www.theverge.com/planes/673462/newark-airport-delay-air-traffic-control-tracon-radar
[17] Ibid.
[18] https://www.newsweek.com/air-traffic-control-staffing-shortage-dc-plane-crash-2024608
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] https://qz.com/newark-airport-cancels-more-flights-sean-duffy-warning-1851780238
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] https://apnews.com/article/doge-faa-air-traffic-firings-safety-67981aec33b6ee72cbad8dcee31f3437
[25]https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-108162/index.html?_gl=1*194bm3h*_ga*MjU4NTk1OTIuMTc0NjgxMTY3Mw..*_ga_V393SNS3SR*czE3NDY4MTE2NzIkbzEkZzAkdDE3NDY4MTE2NzUkajAkbDAkaDA
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.