PHOTO: U.S. NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
BY STAS MARGARONIS & KEVIN POLICARPO
China has been waging a campaign of increased intensity against Taiwan, warning of military action and engaging in tactics that appear to be aimed at grinding down resistance. These tactics consist of intimidating military exercises, patrols and surveillance that so far falls short of armed conflict.
As the two nations continue their geopolitical chess match, military strategists have created multiple possible scenarios that China could undertake in order to seize Taiwan.
A Reuters report dated November 5th, 2021, outlines possible scenarios that vary from attacks on Taiwan’s Matsu and Kinmen islands, to a Customs quarantine, to a blockade and finally an invasion.
The report concludes that China may be running out of time and may be prompted to launch an all-out attack:
“Xi and his top commanders are convinced they are running out of time. With the world recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic that emerged in the Chinese city of Wuhan, China’s global standing is worse than at any time since the Korean War. Its pugnacious ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and its ongoing gray-zone campaign against Taiwan are hardening American and international support for the island. And the Chinese leadership is convinced it has a narrow window of opportunity to unify Taiwan by force. America is strengthening its forces and alliances in Asia, and Taipei is beginning to make urgent moves to beef up its defenses.
Xi and his commanders consider but rule out limited measures, such as seizing outlying islands, imposing blockades or waging an air-and-missile campaign. They calculate these operations are just as likely to ignite a global economic crisis and invite American intervention as a full-scale invasion. And there is no guarantee Taiwan would capitulate.
They decide to mount the biggest and most complex amphibious and airborne landing ever attempted. The PLA’s goal is to overwhelm the island before the United States and its allies can respond.”[1]
LESSONS FROM UKRAINE WAR
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrates to the world what modern combat between conventional, national militaries looks like. With China’s act of aggression toward Taiwan on many military analysts’ minds, the possibility of a war breaking out between the two nations is increasing:
“The impression one gets from conversations around Washington is that many officials believe that a major Chinese use of force against Taiwan — whether an outright invasion or simply a coercive blockade — could come in the next three to five years, once President Xi Jinping is more confident that his fast-modernizing People’s Liberation Army can prevail. Whether the US is ready for the train wreck that so many of its own officials see coming is a different matter.”[2]
U.S. analysts conducted war games with the conditions either favoring the U.S. or China.
The results of the war games were as follows:
“Wargames (sic) played under fairly favorable conditions indicate that the US might be able to squeak out a victory in a war over Taiwan, albeit at a potentially prohibitive price in manpower and materiel. Wargames (sic) played under less favorable conditions typically result in a Chinese victory.”[3]
While the war in Ukraine shows that factors such as motivation and proper leadership can make a difference, the war also “… demonstrates that the US might struggle enormously to compensate for losses it suffered early in a conflict with China, and to provide itself — to say nothing of its allies — with the tools of victory.”[4]
Modern warfare is fought with advanced and expensive weapons that are difficult to reproduce. The war in Ukraine has shown how difficult it is to continue fighting in high intensity conflict. The U.S. and its allies are running into issues with supplying the Ukrainian military with additional weapons from their stockpiles:
“Modern war is prodigiously costly: It destroys some of the most exquisite, expensive creations modern societies can produce. It consumes epic quantities of missiles, artillery shells and other munitions; it can wreck hard-to-replace planes, tanks and warships in large numbers.
The Ukraine war isn’t a fight between two great powers, but it is a case study in how hard it can be simply to keep fighting in high-intensity conflict: A free-world coalition led by a global superpower has struggled to meet the Kyiv government’s needs without dangerously depleting its own stockpiles.”[5]
In their book, “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China”, Hal Brands and Michael Beckley state that the opening months of a U.S.-China conflict would be intense and destructive. They went on to note the following:
“US forces would burn through missiles, torpedoes, precision-guided bombs and other relatively scarce weapons as they tried to stymie a Chinese invasion and break an air and sea blockade of Taiwan.
Losses of ships and planes could be worse than anything the US military has experienced since World War II. According to one recent war game, the US might lose two aircraft carriers and 700 to 900 combat aircraft (nearly half its global inventory). That’s if things go relatively well.
These losses would mount as a conflict dragged on — as any major war between the US and China probably would, since neither side would be keen to concede defeat in a contest for supremacy in the most strategically and economically crucial region of the world.”[6]
In a September, 2022 Opinion piece, Brands argues that while the U.S. maintains the strongest military and largest economy in the world, China is flexing its industrial muscle. China possesses a 3 to 1 ratio in terms of ship production, which would be beneficial as both nations would lose ships in the opening weeks of conflict:
“The economist Noah Smith has even estimated that, ‘While Russia itself can’t manufacture the materiel for a protracted local conflict with Europe, China can manufacture enough to sustain both itself and Russia’ in a global fight against the democratic world.”[7]
The U.S. industrial base is greatly diminished from its time in the Cold War. The number of major US military contractors decreased. The problem of upscaling weapon production is difficult for the Pentagon in a wartime scenario as the United States lacks the machine tools, for example, and trained labor force, for another that it will require for wartime mobilization and production.
Brands goes on to warn:
“Short of war, too, weaknesses in the defense industrial base create serious problems. There is lots of talk in Congress and the executive branch about rapidly arming Taiwan with more anti-ship missiles, drones and other capabilities that can turn the Taiwan Strait into a deadly gantlet. Yet it is not clear where those weapons will come from, absent significant increases in production levels — or a decision to plunder the stocks that the US itself would need if a conflict erupted.”[8]
Mark Cancian from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reflects this concern:
“America’s defense industrial base is designed for peacetime efficiency, not mass wartime production, because maintaining unused capacity for mobilization is expensive.”[9]
MILITARY SEALIFT SHORTFALLS
PHOTO: U.S. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
These challenges come at a time when the Military Sealift Command (MSC) continues to face a shortage of both ships and sailors.
This will take a “collective effort” from government and industry to turn the tide, Rear Adm. Michael Wettlaufer, commander of MSC, said during an event hosted by the Navy League of the United States.
Wettlaufer noted that after the number of U.S. mariners reached their peak during World War II at 262,000, their population has plummeted to a fraction of that today — about 33,000 between 2018-2021. With recruitment and retention a problem across all of the services, MSC faces no easy solutions.
In an October report in Seapower Wetlaufer said that increasing the number of sealift vessels will require MSC to incentivize commercial participation.
“We’ve got to incentivize U.S. flagged shipping,” he said, noting that the number of U.S. flagged ships at their disposal had declined from 282 at the start of this century to 178 today. “On the production side, it’s great; we’re building ships. But we certainly need more.”
On the recruitment side, it is a multi-pronged problem. A lack of U.S. flagged ships causes a decrease in the mariner population naturally, but there are other issues that the command needs to address, Wettlaufer said.
“This ecosystem is under stress [and] this needs our nation’s focus,” Wettlaufer said. “Why does [this decline in mariner population] happen? Have people changed, or are we ignoring the problem? I think we’re ignoring the problem. I think we’re ignoring the engagement opportunity.”
To help fix this issue, MSC will seek to get mariners to sea through a vigorous recruiting campaign, incentives and training. He also said MSC will be more aggressive in preventing sexual assault. Regardless, it will take a “collective effort” between government and industry to deal with this ongoing issue.
Specifically, the top challenges currently facing MSC in this area are an atrophied maritime industry, a reduced U.S. flag commercial fleet and a shortage of ocean-going mariners, he said.[10]
The lack of sufficient investment in ships, shipbuilding and military sealift is reflected in concerns raised in Congress.
JAPAN REARMS
The growing threat posed by China toward Taiwan has motivated Japan to begin a major defense investment, according to a Reuters report:
“Between China’s 20th Communist Party Congress, that began Sunday, and the next one in 2027, Japan will undertake its biggest arms buildup since World War Two in a race to deter Beijing from war in East Asia, according to Japanese government officials and security analysts.
Japan identified China as its chief adversary in its 2019 defense white paper, worried that Beijing’s flouting of international norms, pressure on Taiwan and rapid military modernisation posed a serious security threat. That anxiety has intensified since Russia invaded Ukraine, weakening Japanese public opposition to rearming, security experts say.
Japan’s government ‘has the wind at its back and will use that to do whatever it can,’ said Takashi Kawakami, a professor at Takushoku University in Tokyo. By pointing to 2027 as the moment when East Asia’s power balance may tip in China’s favour, Japan’s government can rally support for greater defense spending, he added.
In addition to being the next time Communist Party delegates gather in Beijing, 2027 is the next major milestone on China’s military modernisation roadmap and the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army. At a congressional hearing last year, U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Philip Davidson said that China’s threat against Taiwan could ‘manifest’ that year.”[11]
WORSENING US-CHINA RELATIONS
Following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, China has moved aircraft and ships over the median line in the Taiwan Strait, fired missiles over the island, and carried out live-fire drills close to Taiwanese territorial waters.
China has also “… imposed economic sanctions on Taiwan and cut military and other co-operation (sic) with America.”[12] Further Chinese actions against Taiwan may include additional economic sanctions against Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party and “… efforts to deter other foreign politicians from visiting the island, and to woo the last dozen or so countries that have diplomatic ties to Taiwan.”[13]
A 2022 Economist report “How the crisis over Taiwan will change US-China relations” notes that the United States has demonstrated restraint in the face of China’s actions, but will likely provide additional training and weapons to Taiwan and resume regular military operations in the Taiwan strait. Some observers are concerned that the escalated tensions between the three nations could increase the risk of potential accidents and miscalculations on both sides.
According to the Pentagon, China’s increased military spending has allowed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve equality or surpass America “… in the number of ships and submarines, long-range surface-to-air missiles and conventional cruise and ballistic missiles it can deploy.”[14] It is unknown if China’s recent military growth would allow it to invade and capture Taiwan. In a wargame conducted by the Center for a New American Security, “… China was able to land troops on the island but could not reach Taipei, let alone achieve a quick victory. The conflict, set in 2027, settled into a protracted war.”[15]
The main challenge for America and its allies in the Pacific is to resist future Chinese aggression without creating another crisis. So far, the U.S. has not sent any new ships to the region, trying to avoid further escalation.
Going forward, however, the U.S. “… will need at the very least to resume regular military activities around Taiwan, including transits through the Taiwan Strait, to maintain credibility among its regional allies.”[16] In addition, the U.S. is likely to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses by selling more offensive weapon systems and either lend or give Taiwan money to buy more equipment.
Finally, Congress is considering passing the Taiwan Policy Act. The act “… would allow the island to join military exercises with America and declare it a ‘major non-nato ally’, facilitating the provision of more advanced weaponry. It would also authorise (sic) ‘de facto diplomatic treatment for Taiwan equivalent to other foreign governments’.”[17]
RAND’S TAIWAN WAR GAME ANALYSIS
In 2021, RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization that produces war games analysis for the Defense Department, published a report: “Preventing China from Taking Taiwan.”
The report was co-written by David Ochmanek. Ochmanek is a senior international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation. From 2009 until 2014, he was the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Force Development. Co-author Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in the foreign policy studies program at the Brookings Institution.
The two authors warned that China had the capability to successfully invade Taiwan. However, they noted that there might be ways for the United States to help Taiwan counter a Chinese attack:
“For Beijing, undertaking such an attack, especially an all-out invasion, would be a cosmic roll of the dice. But war games and calculations we have conducted show that China’s armed forces might be able to pull it off.
For example, they might barrage Taiwan’s airfields and air defenses, ports, big ships, lines of communication, and command/control systems with missile and air attacks before then loading up amphibious vessels for an assault on the island. With Taiwan’s air defenses suppressed, the amphibious assault could be followed up with an airborne invasion by paratroopers and transport helicopters. China might well also strike American forces and bases in the western Pacific, to include aircraft carrier battle groups, aiming to cripple any U.S. effort to defend Taiwan.
Too many of those forces and bases are vulnerable to such attacks, and planned improvements do not, in the main, do much to fix those vulnerabilities.”[18]
However, the authors argue that there may be hope for countering such an attack:
“The good news is that war games and analyses are pointing to new operational concepts and capabilities that can reverse the erosion of the military balance vis-à-vis China. Rather than continue to rely so heavily on big, easily targeted military platforms and facilities in the western Pacific, the United States may need to find ways to deploy and deliver large numbers of sensors and munitions from relatively invulnerable positions, both in the region and beyond.
The technologies to do so are available, affordable and not easily countered by China if acquired in adequate numbers.”[19]
To address the situation with the urgency it requires, “… the Department of Defense (DOD) may need to consider whether to reallocate several billion dollars a year from existing budgetary plans over the next five to 10 years… ”[20] to field these kinds of capabilities:
- “Large numbers of small, unmanned aircraft that do not need runways, being launched from mobile trailers and recovered by parachute, that can use inexpensive sensors to look for Chinese ships and aircraft…
- Up to several dozen large, unmanned underwater vehicles that can loiter in the western Pacific, able to launch missiles that would deploy sea mines or directly attack ships in the vicinity of Taiwan.
- Sufficient stocks of standoff anti-ship missiles to allow the Air Force’s bomber fleet to conduct several days’ worth of intensive attacks against China’s fleet.
- Greater diversification of America’s satellite fleet, to avoid dependence on large vulnerable individual satellites for purposes of reconnaissance and communication.
- For Taiwan’s self-defense forces, several priorities are evident: smart mines, anti-ship missiles deliverable from mobile launchers, highly mobile short-range air defense missile systems, and distributed reconnaissance and communications systems that allow defenders along the shoreline to operate in small, autonomous cells and call in strikes even if their central command and control networks are attacked.”[21]
CONCLUSION: KEVIN RUDD AND THE AVOIDABLE WAR
In his book, ‘The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China’, author and former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd warns that the growing conflict between China and the United States could result in a war that could have dire consequences for the two nations and possibly the entire world.
Rudd believes that war can be avoided if the two nations choose to work together and he “… advocates for ‘managed strategic competition’ where both countries agree to compete without resorting to armed conflict.”[22]
One possible strategy that would reflect Rudd’s vision is for the two countries to work together to fast-track the creation of a renewable energy economy as well as a resilient infrastructure to defend against sea level rise.
If China and the U.S. pool their resources, both countries could help develop their economies and make renewable and resilient policies and practices available to all nations.[23]
The alarming increases in drought and flooding around the world as well as in China and the United States might motivate the two countries to accept the old adage that it might be better to focus on these real threats so that the two nations might hang together rather than hang separately.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Lague, David, & Murray, Maryanne, T-DAY THE BATTLE FOR TAIWAN, Published 5 November 2021, reuters.com, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/
[2] Hal Brands, Ukraine War Shows the US Military Isn’t Ready for War With China, Published September 18, 2022, bloomberg.com, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-18/ukraine-war-shows-the-us-military-isn-t-ready-for-war-with-china#xj4y7vzkg
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7]https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-18/ukraine-war-shows-the-us-military-isn-t-ready-for-war-with-china#xj4y7vzkg
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid.
[10]https://seapowermagazine.org/rear-adm-wettlaufer-shortage-of-ships-mariners-an-ongoing-problem-for-military-sealift-command/
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/japan-rushes-rearm-with-eye-2027-chinas-taiwan-ambitions-2022-10-18/
[12] The Economist, How the crisis over Taiwan will change US-China relations, Published 11 August 2022, economist.com, https://www.economist.com/china/2022/08/11/how-the-crisis-over-taiwan-will-change-us-china-relations
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ochmanek, David A. & O’Hanlon, Michael, Preventing China from Taking Taiwan, Published 9 December 2021, rand.org, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/preventing-china-from-taking-taiwan.html
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Stas Margaronis, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China by Kevin Rudd (Review), Published June 9 2022, rbtus.com, https://rbtus.com/the-avoidable-war-the-dangers-of-a-catastrophic-conflict-between-the-us-and-xi-jinpings-china-by-kevin-rudd-review/
[23] Ibid.